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‘Preventing	  dangerous	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change’	   (UNFCCC	  1992)	  will	  only	  be	  
feasible	  with	   substantial	   emission	   reductions	   below	   the	   business-­‐as-­‐usual	   case	   in	  
developing	   countries.	   Because	   of	   the	   central	   role	   of	   energy	   for	   economic	  
development,	   reducing	   emissions	   in	   developing	   countries	   without	   undermining	  
their	   development	   goals	   requires	   a	   fundamental	   structural	   break	  of	   the	  historical	  
correlation	   between	   economic	   growth	   and	   GHG	   emissions.	   While	   possible	   in	  
theory,	   such	   a	   transformation	   of	   the	   global	   energy	   system	   would	   impose	  
considerable	  costs	  on	  developing	  countries.	  Even	   if	   these	  costs	  were	  fully	  covered	  
by	   industrialized	   countries,	   mitigation	   measures	   could	   still	   be	   unattractive	   to	  
developing	  countries	  due	  to	  a	  possible	  ‘climate	  rent	  curse’	  through	  which	  financial	  
inflows	   negatively	   affect	   recipients’	   economic	   performance.	   Mitigation	   measures	  
could	   further	   meet	   resistance	   because	   of	   adverse	   distributional	   impacts	   and	  
political	  economy	  reasons.	  Hence,	  we	  caution	  against	  overly	  optimistic	  expectations	  
regarding	   the	   opportunities	   to	   drastically	   re-­‐orient	   development	   paths	   towards	  
low-­‐carbon	   growth.	   	   Instead,	   we	   suggest	   that	   mitigation	   efforts	   in	   developing	  
countries	   should	   focus	   on	   ‘feasible	   mitigation	   actions’	   that	   seek	   to	   maximize	  
mitigation	  as	  a	  positive	  co-­‐benefit	  of	  policies	  with	  different	  objectives.	  	  
	  




Today’s	  developed	  countries	  account	  for	  the	  largest	  share	  of	  global	  greenhouse	  gas	  (GHG)	  emissions	  
accumulated	   in	   the	   atmosphere.	   However,	   recent	   years	   have	   witnessed	   a	   rapid	   increase	   in	  
developing	  countries’	  emissions,	  most	  prominently	  in	  China,	  which	  has	  not	  only	  become	  the	  world’s	  
largest	   emitter	   in	   2006,	   but	  whose	   per-­‐capita	   emissions	   are	   now	   already	   close	   to	   the	   EU	   average	  
(7.2t	   vs.	   7.5t	   of	   energy	   related	   CO2	   emissions	   in	   2011,	   respectively,	   Olivier	   et	   al.	   2012).	   If	   other	  
developing	  countries	  follow	  China’s	  carbon-­‐intensive	  growth	  pattern,	  ambitious	  climate	  stabilization	  
targets	  –	  such	  as	  the	  2°C	  target	  agreed	  by	  the	  world	  community	  (Jaeger	  and	  Jaeger	  2011)	  –	  are	  likely	  
to	  become	  infeasible	  even	   if	   industrialized	  countries	  were	  to	  drastically	  reduce	  their	  emissions	  (IEA	  
2011).	  For	  this	  reason,	  ‘preventing	  dangerous	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change’	  (UNFCCC	  1992)	  without	  
undermining	   poor	   countries’	   growth	   prospects	   requires	   a	   fundamental	   structural	   break	   of	   the	  
historical	  correlation	  between	  economic	  growth	  and	  GHG	  emissions.	  As	  will	  be	  argued	  in	  this	  article,	  
such	  a	  transition	  towards	  ‘low-­‐carbon	  development’	  (World	  Bank	  2010)	  –	  while	  possible	  in	  theory	  –	  is	  
fraught	  with	  considerable	  problems	   in	  practice	  due	  to	   the	  central	   role	   that	   fossil	   fuels	  have	  played	  
and	  continue	   to	  play	   for	  economic	  development.	   Furthermore,	  even	   if	   the	  additional	   costs	  of	   low-­‐
carbon	  technologies	   (compared	  to	  conventional	   fossil	  energy	  sources)	  were	   in	   theory	   fully	  covered	  
by	   industrialized	   countries,	   mitigation	   measures	   could	   still	   be	   unattractive	   for	   both	   recipient	   and	  
donor	   countries	   due	   to	   a	   possible	   ‘climate	   rent	   curse’	   through	   which	   financial	   inflows	   negatively	  
affect	   recipients’	   economic	  performance.	  Hence,	  we	   caution	   against	   overly	   optimistic	   expectations	  
regarding	  the	  opportunities	  to	  drastically	  re-­‐orient	  development	  paths	  towards	   low-­‐carbon	  growth.	  	  
Instead,	   we	   suggest	   that	   mitigation	   efforts	   in	   developing	   countries	   should	   focus	   on	   ‘feasible	  
mitigation	  actions’	  that	  	  seek	  to	  maximize	  mitigation	  as	  a	  positive	  co-­‐benefit	  of	  policies	  with	  different	  
objectives.	  	  
	  
II. Economic	  Growth,	  Income	  Distribution,	  Energy	  Use,	  and	  Carbon	  Emissions	  
	  
Socio-­‐economic	  development	   in	   the	  past	  has	  been	  closely	  correlated	  to	  energy	  use	   (Grübler,	  2008;	  
Schäfer,	  2005).	  As	  fossil	  fuels	  have	  traditionally	  constituted	  the	  major	  source	  of	  energy,	  there	  is	  also	  
a	  close	  correlation	  between	  human	  development	  and	  GHG	  emissions	  (Costa	  et	  al.	  2011).	  No	  country	  
has	  managed	  to	  achieve	  high	  levels	  of	  economic	  development	  without	  having	  crossed	  a	  threshold	  in	  
final	  energy	  consumption	  of	  approximately	  40	  GJ	  /	  capita	  (Steinberger	  and	  Roberts	  2010;	  Steckel	  et	  
al.	   2013).	   Only	   a	   fourth	   of	   these	   energy	   needs	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   energy	   needed	   for	   covering	  
subsistence	   needs	   like	   cooking	   or	   heating	   (e.g.	   Pereira	   et	   al.	   2011);	   an	   important	   part	   of	   the	  
threshold	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   energy	   needed	   e.g.	   to	   build	   up	   infrastructure	   stocks	   (Steckel	   et	   al.,	  
2013).	  	  	  	  
	  
Developing	  countries,	  in	  particular	  China,	  have	  shown	  particularly	  high	  growth	  of	  GHG	  emissions.	  For	  
China,	  but	  also	  for	  other	  newly	  industrializing	  countries,	  economic	  growth	  can	  clearly	  be	  identified	  to	  
be	   the	  main	   driver	   of	   rising	   CO2	   emissions	   (Steckel	   et	   al.	   2011),	   in	   particularfor	   the	   2000s.	   	   Even	  
though	  per	  capita	  emissions	   still	   remain	  below	   the	  OECD	  average	   they	  are	   -­‐	  at	   least	   in	   the	  case	  of	  
China	  -­‐	  catching	  up	  fast.1	  This	   trend	   is	   reinforced	  by	  a	  global	  “renaissance”	  of	  coal	   that	   leads	  to	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Due	  to	  international	  trade,	  those	  emissions	  are	  to	  some	  extent	  embedded	  in	  goods	  that	  are	  finally	  consumed	  
in	  developed	  countries	  (Davis	  and	  Caldeira	  2010;	  Peters	  et	  al.	  2011).	  However,	  observed	  flows	  of	  emission	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increasing	  carbonization	  of	  the	  global	  energy	  system	  (Steckel	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  These	  trends	  in	  economic	  
development,	   energy	   use,	   and	   carbon	   emissions	   in	   developing	   countries	   suggest	   that	   they	   are	  
replicating	  the	  pattern	  observed	  in	  the	  past	  in	  today’s	  rich	  countries	  –	  albeit	  at	  an	  accelerated	  pace	  
(Jakob	  et	  al.	  2012b).	  This	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  1,	  which	  shows	  per-­‐capita	  CO2	  emissions	  against	  per-­‐
capita	  GDP.	  It	  is	  remarkable	  that	  this	  relationship	  is	  very	  similar	  for	  most	  countries	  except	  for	  some	  
notable	   outliers,	   in	   particular	   the	   US	   with	   persistently	   higher	   per	   capita	   emissions	   than	   other	  
countries	  at	  comparable	  incomes.	  For	  instance,	  China’s	  current	  per-­‐capita	  emissions	  are	  very	  close	  to	  
those	  of	  Korea	  or	  Japan	  at	  this	  income	  level.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  CO2	  per	  capita	  (CDIAC	  2013)	  over	  GDP	  per	  capita	  (in	  1990	   int’l	  USD,	  Maddison	  2010)	  for	  selected	  
countries	  from	  1900	  –	  2008	  for	  10	  year	  intervals	  (when	  available).	  	  
	  
Interestingly,	   similar	   patterns	   can	   also	   be	   found	   in	   studies	   investigating	   the	   carbon	   footprint	   of	  
households	   at	   the	   micro	   level	   for	   selected	   developing	   countries.	   In	   other	   words,	   an	   Indonesian	  
household	  with	  the	  income	  of	  the	  average	  European	  household	  exhibits	  a	  carbon	  footprint	  similar	  to	  
that	  of	  the	  average	  European.	  Specifically,	  analyses	  for	  India,	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  Philippines	  show	  that	  
richer	  households	   in	   these	  countries	  have	  considerably	  higher	   carbon	   footprints	   than	  poorer	  ones.	  	  
(Grunewald	  et	  al.,	  2012a;	  Serino,	  2012;	  Irfany,	  2013).	  	  Figure	  2	  shows	  that	  for	  these	  three	  countries	  
the	  relationship	  between	   income	  and	  CO2	  emissions	   in	  a	  cross-­‐section	  of	  households	  rather	  closely	  
matches	  the	  relationship	  between	  GDP	  and	  emissions	  over	  time	  on	  the	  macro-­‐economic	   level.	  This	  
suggests	  that	  income	  is	  the	  most	  important	  driver	  of	  variations	  of	  emissions	  over	  time	  and	  between	  
households.	  The	  figure	  also	  illustrates	  the	  great	  extent	  of	  inequality	  of	  incomes	  in	  these	  countries	  –	  
for	  example,	   the	  mean	   income	  of	   Indonesian	  households	   in	   the	  highest	   income	  quintile	   is	   about	  8	  
times	  the	  income	  of	  those	  in	  the	  lowest	  quintile.	  The	  slightly	  concave	  shape	  of	  these	  curves	  suggests	  
that	   income	   inequality,	   at	   least	   at	   low	   levels	   of	   income,	   translates	   into	   even	   higher	   inequality	   in	  
carbon	  emissions.	  From	  these	  observations	  it	  may	  be	  inferred	  that	  that	  an	  emerging	  middle	  class,	  at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
embodied	  in	  trade	  should	  not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  ‘outsourcing’	  of	  emissions,	  as	  a	  solid	  assessment	  of	  
developed	  countries’	  responsibility	  for	  rising	  emissions	  in	  developing	  countries	  would	  require	  an	  assessment	  of	  
a	  counterfactual	  situation	  (i.e.	  what	  these	  emissions	  would	  be	  without	  trade;	  see	  Jakob	  and	  Marschinski	  2013).	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Figure	   2:	   Combined	   microand	   macro	   data	   for	   India,	   Indonesia	   and	   the	   Philippines.	   For	   household	   data	  
income	  quintiles	  (with	  emission	  for	  income	  quintiles	  shown	  at	  their	  mean	  income)	  are	  shown,	  derived	  from	  
Grunewald	  et	  al.	  (2012a)	  for	  India,	  Serino	  (2012)	  for	  Indonesia	  and	  Irfany	  (2013)	  for	  the	  Philippines.	  Macro	  
economic	  data	  are	  taken	  from	  CDIAC	  (2013)	  for	  CO2	  per	  capita	  and	  Maddison	  (2010)	  for	  GDP	  per	  capita	  data	  
showing	  data	  points	  for	  every	  10	  years	  from	  1900	  to	  2008	  when	  available.	  	  
	  
However,	  empirical	  studies	  also	  suggest	  that	  at	  higher	  levels	  of	  income,	  per	  capita	  emissions	  increase	  
less	  than	  proportionally	  with	  per	  capita	  income	  (Serino,	  2012;	  Irfany,	  2013).	  That	  is,	  threshold	  effects,	  
for	   example	   ownership	   of	   energy-­‐intensive	   consumption	   goods	   including	   refrigerators,	   air-­‐
conditioners	   or	   cars	   at	   some	   income	   threshold,	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   present.	   	   Then,	   high-­‐inequality	  
countries	   are	   not	   necessarily	   high	   per	   capita	   emitters;	   i.e.,	   the	   aggregate	   relationship	   between	  
income	  inequality,	  measured	  for	  example	  by	  the	  Gini	  index,	  and	  GHG	  emissions	  is	  ambiguous.	  Using	  
aggregate	  panel	  data,	  Grunewald	  et	  al.	  (2012b)	  show	  that,	  on	  average,	  lower	  inequality	  is	  associated	  
with	  higher	  per	  capita	  emissions,	  as	  displayed	  in	  Figure	  3.	  This	  result	  may	  be	  driven	  by	  a	  ‘middle	  class	  
effect’;	   	  with	  people	  with	  mid-­‐range	  incomes	   improving	  their	   income	  situation,	  thereby	  making	  the	  
income	   distribution	   more	   equal,	   average	   per	   capita	   emissions	   also	   increase.	   This	   ‘emissions-­‐
increasing	  effect	  of	  lower	  inequality’	  is	  smaller	  in	  richer	  countries	  (and	  even	  reversed	  for	  the	  highest	  







Figure	  3:	  Relationship	  between	  income	  inequality	  (measured	  by	  the	  natural	  logarithm	  of	  the	  Gini	  index	  (on	  a	  
scale	   from	  0	  to	  100;	  x-­‐axis)	  and	  the	  natural	   logarithm	  of	  per-­‐capita	  CO2	  emissions	   (in	  kilograms;	  y-­‐axis)	  by	  
income	  quintile.	  Source:	  Grunewald	  et	  al.	  (2012a)	  
	  
Taken	  together,	  the	  above	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  developing	  and	  emerging	  countries	  are	  unlikely	  to	  
decarbonize	   their	   development	   paths	   anytime	   soon.	   	   Instead,	   it	   looks	   more	   likely	   that	   per-­‐capita	  
emissions	   will	   only	   stabilize	   or	   decline	   at	   comparatively	   high	   income	   levels.	   	   Such	   a	   scenario	   is	  
corrobated	   by	   the	   finding	   that	   the	   carbon	   footprints	   of	   rich	   households	   in	   developing	   countries	  
already	  resemble	  those	  of	  average	  households	  in	  the	  developed	  countries.	  These	  observations	  have	  
three	   immediate	   implications.	   	   First,	   only	   a	   drastic	   transformation	   of	   the	   global	   energy	   system	  
towards	  low-­‐emission	  energy	  sources	  (such	  as	  renewable	  energy,	  carbon	  capture	  and	  sequestration,	  
or	   nuclear)	   could	   help	   change	   this	   situation;	   second,	   poor	   and	   emerging	   economies	   would	   need	  
substantial	  financial	  support	  to	  cover	  the	  incremental	  costs	  of	  low	  carbon	  development	  paths	  (Collier	  
and	   Venables,	   2012);	   third,	   the	   pattern	   of	   within-­‐country	   differences	   in	   income	   and	   consumption	  
levels	  and	  carbon	  footprints	  has	  an	  important	  bearing	  on	  the	  emissions	  intensity	  of	  economic	  growth	  
and,	   hence,	   on	  policies	   that	  may	  be	   able	   to	   reconcile	   social	   and	  GHG	   reduction	  objectives.	   	   These	  
issues	  are	  taken	  up	  below.	  	  	  
	  
	  
III. Challenges	  to	  energy	  system	  transformation	  in	  developing	  and	  emerging	  countries	  
	  
a. Feasibility	  of	  emission	  reductions	  
Given	   the	   strong	   link	   between	   energy	   consumption	   and	   development	   in	   the	   past,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	  
expected	   that	   future	   growth	   of	   today’s	   poor	   countries	   will	   require	   a	   large	   amount	   of	   additional	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countries	  will	  not	  significantly	  increase	  their	  current	  levels	  of	  energy	  use	  in	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  
scenarios.	   In	   the	   light	   of	   the	   results	   described	   in	   Section	   II,	   reducing	   energy	   consumption	  below	  a	  
particular	  threshold	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  feasible	  option,	  as	  energy	  will	  be	  required	  for	  basic	  needs,	  
infrastructure	   and	   other	   consumption	   goods	   demanded	   by	   a	   growing	   middle	   class	   in	   today’s	  
developing	  countries	   (Ekholm	  et	  al.	  2010).	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  developing	  countries	  are	  expected	  to	  
perform	  a	  large	  and	  rising	  share	  of	  global	  mitigation.	  That	  is,	  in	  ambitious	  mitigation	  scenarios	  (IPCC	  
category	   I	   +	   II,	   ref),	   the	  median	   share	   of	   emission	   reductions	   (compared	   to	   the	   business-­‐as-­‐usual	  
scenario)	  taking	  place	  in	  developing	  (non-­‐Annex	  I)	  countries	  is	  more	  than	  60%	  in	  the	  near	  term	  and	  
more	  than	  70%	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century	  as	  shown	  by	  Figure	  4.	  	  
a)	   Medium	   ambitious	   mitigation	   scenarios	   (IPCC	  
category	  III	  +	  IV)	  
	  
b)	   Ambitious	   mitigation	   scenarios	   (IPCC	  
category	  I	  +	  II)	  	  
	  
Figure	   4:	   Percentage	   of	   global	   mitigation	   carried	   out	   by	   non-­‐Annex	   I	   countries	   in	   differently	   ambitious	  
climate	  mitigation	  scenarios	  compared	  to	  scenarios	  without	  climate	  mitigation	  in	  scenarios	  calculated	  for	  the	  
ADAM	  (Edenhofer	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  and	  RECIPE	   (Luderer	  et	  al.	  2012)	  model	   inter-­‐comparison	  excercises.	  Boxes	  
show	  the	  25	  –	  75	  percentile	  ranges,	  whiskers	  the	  maxima	  and	  minima	  and	  the	  bold	  lines	  show	  the	  median.	  	  
Large	  scale	  adoption	  of	  low-­‐carbon	  energy	  sources	  (RE,	  nuclear	  energy,	  CCS)	  could	  permit	  to	  increase	  
energy	  use	  without	  at	  the	  same	  time	  increasing	  emissions.	  In	  particular	  renewable	  energy	  is	  seen	  to	  
be	   key	   in	   energy	   system	   transformations,	   shown	   to	   have	   the	   highest	   option	   value	   of	   low	   carbon	  
energy	  technologies,	  i.e.	  forgoing	  an	  expansion	  of	  RE	  would	  result	  in	  a	  more	  pronounced	  increase	  in	  
abatement	   costs	   than	   forgoing	   the	   expansion	   of	   other	   technology	   options	   (Luderer	   et	   al.	   2012).	  
Today,	  renewable	  energy	  accounts	  for	  only	  about	  11%	  of	  energy	  use	  in	  developing	  countries	  of	  which	  
the	  largest	  share	  is	  traditional	  biomass	  and	  hydro	  power	  (Pfeiffer	  et	  al.	  in	  press).	  While	  the	  potential	  
for	  renewable	  energy	  is	  usually	  seen	  to	  be	  large,	  it	  is	  often	  still	  more	  expensive	  than	  fossil	  fuels	  (IPCC	  
2011).	  Additional	  obstacles	  including	  lacking	  institutional	  capacities	  and	  credit	  constraints	  also	  hinder	  
the	  transformation	  of	  the	  energy	  system	  on	  a	  larger	  scale	  (Staub-­‐Kaminski	  et	  al.	  in	  press,	  Collier	  and	  
Venables	  2012).	  	  
On	  the	  micro	  energy	  level,	  renewable	  energy	  technologies	  are	  often	  competitive	  today	  (Casillas	  and	  
Kammen	  2010)	  and	  can	  contribute	  to	  fulfilling	  basic	  needs.	  However,	  such	  decarbonization	  of	  energy	  
systems	  is	  linked	  to	  very	  high	  incomes.	  	  	  A	  recent	  analysis	  of	  Kenyan	  households’	  lighting	  fuel	  choices,	  
which	  suggests	  that	  while	  there	  is	  a	  cross-­‐sectional	  energy	  ladder,	  the	  income	  threshold	  for	  modern	  
fuel	   use	   –	   including	   solar	   energy	   use	   –	   is	   very	   high	   (Lay	   et	   al.	   2012).	   Furthermore,	   scaling	   up	   low	  
carbon	   energy-­‐supply	   to	   a	   level	   needed	   beyond	   fulfilling	   basic	   needs	   is	   rather	   difficult	   and	  would	  
probably	  impose	  additional	  costs	  on	  developing	  countries	  (Jakob	  and	  Steckel	  2013).	  	  This	  implies	  that	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required	  to	  promote	  renewable	  energies	  in	  developing	  counties.	  	  Due	  to	  persistent	  energy	  shortages,	  
legitimate	  energy	  access	   targets,	  and	  high	  economic	  growth,	   the	  cost	  of	  waiting	  until	   such	  support	  
materializes,	  is	  high	  (Collier	  and	  Venables,	  2012),	  necessitating	  fast	  concerted	  action	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  
lock-­‐in	  effects	  that	  would	  make	  a	  reorientation	  of	  energy	  systems	  more	  difficult	  and	  costly	  in	  future	  
(Jakob	  et	  al.	  2012a).	  	  	  
	  	  
b. A	  climate	  rent	  curse?	  
It	   is	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  developing	  countries	  should	  not	  be	  negatively	   influenced	  by	  climate	  
change	   mitigation,	   as	   e.g.	   reflected	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   principle	   of	   ‘common	   but	   differentiated	  
responsibilities’	   (Mattoo	   and	   Subramanian	   2010).	   As	   a	   consequence,	   scenarios	   frequently	   assume	  
that	  mitigation	  efforts	  are	  shared	  globally	  according	  to	  an	  equitable	  allocation	  scheme	  (e.g.	  emission	  
certificates	  being	   allocated	   according	   to	   an	  equal	   per	   capita	   scheme).	   Studying	   the	  effects	   of	   such	  
schemes	  generally	  leads	  to	  mitigation	  for	  developing	  countries	  being	  feasible	  at	  acceptable	  costs	  or	  
even	  gains	  (Luderer	  et	  al.	  2012)	  due	  to	  sizable	  financial	  transfers	  from	  developed	  regions;	  thus	  these	  
transfers	   should	   help	   overcome	   financial	   and	   institutional	   barriers	   for	   low-­‐carbon	   development.2	  
Jakob	  et	  al.	   (2012c)	  estimate	   these	   financial	   transfers	   could	   -­‐	  at	   least	   for	   those	  allocation	   schemes	  
that	  are	  usually	  perceived	  to	  be	  the	  most	  equitable	  -­‐	  reach	  almost	  USD	  400	  bln	  in	  2020	  and	  for	  some	  
regions	   be	   of	   a	   comparable	   order	   of	  magnitude	   as	   revenues	   from	  natural	   resource	   exports	   in	   the	  
past.	  	  	  
Such	  sizable	  transfers,	  however,	  might	  negatively	  affect	  long	  term	  growth	  prospects,	  comparable	  to	  
adverse	   effects	   observed	   for	   natural	   resource	   revenues	   (Sachs	   and	  Warner	   1995,	   Nordhaus	   2007)	  
and	  foreign	  aid	  (Djankov	  et	  al.	  2008).The	  literature	  (see	  van	  der	  Ploeg	  2011	  for	  a	  detailed	  review)	  has	  
identified	  several	  channels	  to	  drive	  this	  so-­‐called	  ‘resource	  curse’,	  of	  which	  Dutch	  Disease,	  volatility,	  
and	   rent	   seeking	   in	   combination	   with	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   institutional	   environment	   are	   most	  
important.	   	   Analyzing	   similarities	   between	   those	   channels,	   Kornek	   et	   al.	   (2013)	   conclude	   that	  
financial	  transfers	  for	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  could	  generally	  be	  comparable	  to	  resource	  revenues	  
and	  hence	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  result	  in	  a	  ‘climate	  rent	  curse’,	  in	  particular	  for	  countries	  with	  weak	  
institutions.	   Figure	   5	   shows	   indicators	   for	   ‘rule	   of	   law’	   and	   ‘control	   of	   corruption’	   exemplarily	   for	  
institutional	   quality,	   ranging	   from	   -­‐2.5	   to	   2.5	   (WGI,	   2013)	   for	   countries	   that	   would	   have	   received	  
transfers	  if	  an	  ‘equal	  per	  capita’	  allocation	  scheme	  had	  been	  in	  place	  in	  20083.	  Countries	  are	  ranked	  
according	  to	  the	  share	  of	  the	   inflows	   in	  GDP.	  Countries	  that	  receive	  the	  highest	   transfers	  generally	  
also	   score	   relatively	   badly	   (i.e.	   below	   0)	   on	   institutional	   quality.	   In	   particular,	   with	   very	   few	  
exceptions,	   countries	   that	   receive	  more	   than	  median	   financial	   inflows	   display	   institutional	   quality	  
below	  the	  median	  (i.e.	  the	  upper	  right	  quadrant	  is	  practically	  empty).	  As	  institutional	  quality	  is	  often	  
perceived	  as	  crucial	  for	  absorbing	  financial	  inflows	  (Kornek	  et	  al.	  2013,	  looking	  at	  selected	  countries),	  
Figure	  5	  suggests	  that	  most	  of	  the	  countries	  receiving	  the	  highest	  inflows	  might	  indeed	  be	  at	  risk	  of	  
suffering	  from	  a	  ‘climate	  finance	  curse’.	  In	  addition,	  while	  financial	  transfersare	  usually	  perceived	  to	  
result	   in	   higher	   degrees	   of	   participation	   in	   international	   climate	   agreements	   (e.g.	   	   Altamirano-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Propositions	  to	  establish	  a	  global	  carbon	  budget	  (WBGU,	  2009,)	  similarly	  imply	  considerable	  financial	  
transfers,	  mostly	  for	  countries	  at	  an	  early	  stage	  of	  development.	  
3	  Here,	  we	  assume	  per	  capita	  emission	  rights	  of	  two	  tons;	  note	  that	  we	  only	  consider	  energy-­‐related	  emissions.	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Cabrera	   and	   Finus	   2006,	  Weikard	   2009),	   international	   cooperation	   could	   be	   significantly	   impeded	  
when	  taking	  into	  account	  potential	  negative	  effects	  of	  financial	  inflows	  from	  climate	  finance	  (Kornek	  
et	  al.	  2013).	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5:	  Indicators	  for	  ‘control	  of	  corruption’	  and	  ‘rule	  of	  law’	  ranging	  from	  -­‐2.5	  for	  very	  low	  to	  2.5	  for	  very	  
high	  institutional	  quality	  (Source:	  WGI	  2013)	  over	  countries	  with	  per	  capita	  emissions	  of	  lower	  than	  2t	  in	  the	  
year	  2008,	  i.e.	  those	  would	  have	  received	  transfers	  if	  an	  international	  carbon	  market	  based	  on	  an	  ‘equal	  per	  
capita’	  allocation	  had	  been	  in	  place	  in	  2008	  (Based	  on	  data	  from	  WDI	  2013).	  	  Countries	  are	  ranked	  based	  on	  
the	  financial	  inflows’	  share	  in	  GDP	  independent	  of	  a	  potential	  carbon	  price.	  	  
	  
c. Income	  Distribution	  and	  Political	  Economy	  Issues	  
The	   relationship	   between	   household	   incomes	   and	   emissions	   discussed	   in	   Section	   II	   suggests	   that	  
countries	  in	  certain	  phases	  of	  economic	  development	  may	  face	  a	  trade-­‐off:	  While	  income	  growth	  for	  
lower	   and	  middle	   income	   classes,	   and	   hence	   lower	   inequality,	   is	   desirable	   for	  many	   reasons	   (see	  
Klasen	  2008),	  such	  income	  growth	  pattern	  may	  lead	  to	  higher	  per-­‐capita	  emissions,	  mainly	  because	  
of	   increased	   modern	   carbon-­‐intensive	   energy	   use.	   For	   rich	   countries,	   (including	   most	   current	  
industrialized	   countries),	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   lower	   inequality	  would	   be	   associated	  with	   lower	   per	  
capita	  emissions	  so	  that	  there	  is	  clear	  evidence	  of	  a	  win-­‐win	  situation.	   	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  high	  
carbon	   footprint	   of	   rich(er)	   households	   in	   developing	   countries	   would	   offer	   pathways	   to	   reduce	  
emissions	   while	   simultaneously	   addressing	   income	   inequality	   through	  well-­‐designed	   price	   and	   tax	  
policies.	  However,	  rising	  growth	  and	  prosperity	  in	  developing	  countries	  has	  in	  many	  countries	  been	  
accompanied	   by	   a	   policy	   environment	   that	   actually	   promotes	   carbon	   intensive	   lifestyles.	   A	  
prominent	  example	  are	  fossil	  fuel	  subsidies.	  	  Besides	  their	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  environment	  and	  
local	  air	  pollution,	  they	  create	  substantial	  externalities	  such	  as	  congestion	  and	  impose	  high	  costs	  on	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state	   budgets.	   For	   instance,	   in	   2011	   the	   Iran	   spent	   roughly	   USD	   65	   bln	   on	   subsidizing	   energy	  
consumption,	  India	  about	  USD	  34	  bln	  and	  China	  about	  USD	  20	  bln	  (IEA	  and	  OECD	  2013).	  Despite	  their	  
adverse	   impacts,	   fuel	   subsidies	  of	   different	   kinds	   are	   still	   a	   common	  policy	   instrument	   throughout	  
the	  developing	  world.	  This	  is	  likely	  explained	  by	  political	  economy	  arguments,	  with	  powerful	  interest	  
groups	  blocking	  subsidy	  reforms	  that	  might	  result	  in	  more	  efficient	  energy	  use	  and	  have	  progressive	  
distributional	  impacts,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  reducing	  CO2	  emissions	  (Sterner	  et	  al.	  2011,	  Rao	  2012).	  
	  
IV. Conclusions:	  A	  step-­‐wise	  approach	  for	  low-­‐carbon	  development	  
Our	  analysis	  points	  to	  a	  major	  dilemma	  for	  global	  climate	  policy:	  While	  mitigation	  of	  GHG	  emissions	  
in	   developing	   countries	  will	   be	   essential	   in	   any	   effort	   to	   limit	   global	  warming,	   economic	   growth	   is	  
closely	   related	  to	  energy	  use,	  and	  spontaneous	   leap-­‐frogging	  to	   less	  energy-­‐intensive	  development	  
paths	   seems	   highly	   unlikely.	   Yet,	   requiring	   developing	   countries	   to	   forgo	   economic	   growth	   and	  
putting	  their	  development	  goals	  at	  risk	  is	  clearly	  not	  defensible	  from	  an	  ethical	  perspective.	  
Concerns	   about	   foregone	   growth	   opportunities	   are	   probably	   the	   fundamental	   explanation	   why	   a	  
globally	  binding	  climate	  agreement	  is	  very	  unlikely	  to	  materialize	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  Yet,	  several	  non-­‐
Annex	   I	   countries,	   including	   China,	   Mexico,	   South	   Korea	   and	   Vietnam	   have	   recently	   announced	  
unilateral	   emission	   targets	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   emission	   trading	   systems	   (Townshend	   et	   al.	   2013).	  
According	   to	   Ostrom	   (2010),	   these	   developments	   are	   at	   odds	   with	   conventional	   collective	   action	  
theory	   that	   would	   predict	   free-­‐riding	   incentives	   to	   undermine	   the	   implementation	   of	   effective	  
climate	   policies	   (Carraro	   and	   Siniscalco,	   1993,	   Barrett,	   1994).	   In	   reality,	   however,	   policy	   makers	  
usually	  pursue	  multiple	  objectives,	   some	  of	  which	  may	  be	   related	   to	   climate	  policies.	   Therefore,	   a	  
‘polycentric’	  perspective	  could	  identify	  incentives	  for	  actors	  on	  different	  governance	  levels	  to	  adopt	  
policies	  with	  objectives	  that	  are	  not	  related	  to	  climate	  change,	  but	  that	  still	  mitigate	  GHG	  emissions	  –	  
as	   a	   co-­‐benefit.	   Such	   policies	   may	   form	   the	   core	   of	   ‘feasible	   mitigation	   actions’	   for	   developing	  
countries.	  For	  instance,	  policies	  aimed	  at	  improving	  public	  transport	  and	  energy	  access	  may	  primarily	  
be	   implemented	  from	  a	  development	  perspective,	  but	  may	  nevertheless	  offer	  significant	  emissions	  
reduction	   potentials	   (Creutzig	   and	   He	   2009).	   Environmental	   regulation	   may	   not	   only	   bring	   about	  
important	  health	  co-­‐benefits	  (Nemet	  et	  al.	  2010),	  but	  also	  result	  in	  higher	  energy-­‐efficiency	  (Zimmer	  
et	  al.	  2013).	  Off-­‐grid	  solutions	  are	  economically	  viable	  solutions	  to	  provide	  electricity	  to	  very	  remote	  
rural	  locations	  and	  they	  typically	  use	  low	  carbon	  energy	  sources	  (Casillas	  and	  Kammen	  2010,	  Doll	  and	  
Pachauri	   2010).	   In	   some	   countries,	   energy	   security	   considerations	   may	   drive	   energy	   system	  
transformation	  (Dubash	  2013).	  
Voluntary	  national	  or	  regional	  policies	  adopted	  by	  some	  first	  movers	  could	  in	  the	  future	  evolve	  into	  a	  
global	   system	   of	   loosely	   coordinated	   climate	   agreements	   that	   provide	   flexibility	   with	   regard	   to	  
structures	   and	  enforcement	  mechanisms	   (Barrett	   and	  Toman	  2010).	   For	   instance,	   it	   is	   conceivable	  
that	   emerging	   emission	   trading	   systems	   in	   developing	   countries	   could	   be	   linked	   to	   those	   in	  
industrialized	   regions	   (for	   instance	   the	   EU	   ETS	   or	   Australia’s	   planned	   emission	   trading	   system)	   by	  
allowing	  trading	  of	  emission	  permits	  between	  systems.	   In	  the	   longer	  term,	  such	   ‘small	  steps’	  could	  
promote	   technological	   innovation	   and	   change	   the	   political	   landscape	   to	   pave	   the	   way	   towards	   a	  
gradual	  expansion	  (Urpelainen	  2013)	  and	  finally	  a	  (at	  least	  almost)	  global	  carbon	  market	  (Flachsland	  
et	   al.	   2009).	   An	   additional	   multi-­‐level	   governance	   approach	   to	   incentivize	   emission	   reductions	  
consists	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   regional	   integration	   agreements	   (RTAs)	   that	   go	   beyond	   trade	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liberalization	   and	   include	   inter	   alia	   environmental	   provisions.	   Recent	   studies	   have	   found	   empirical	  
evidence	  such	  RTAs	  reduce	  absolute	  pollution	  levels	  (Bagdadiet	  al.	  2013)	  	  
The	   systematic	   identification	  of	  all	   the	  above	  options,	  whose	  mix	  will	  obviously	  differ	   considerably	  
between	  countries,	  should	  be	  closely	  aligned	  with	  the	  process	  of	  formulating‘nationally	  appropriate	  
mitigation	   actions’	   (NAMAs,	   see	  UNFCCC	   2009).	   This	   process	  would	   also	   clarify	   the	   assistance	   and	  
possibly	  associated	   financial	   requirements	   that	  could	  partly	  be	  covered	  by	   the	  Green	  Climate	  Fund	  
and	  bi-­‐	  and	  multi-­‐lateral	  donors,	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  or	  the	  GEF.	  In	  addition,	  donors	  have	  already	  
begun	   to	  mainstream	   climate	   change	   into	   their	   aid	   portfolios,	  which	   should	   give	   some	   impetus	   to	  
reducing	  emissions	  in	  areas	  not	  primarily	  targeted	  at	  climate	  change	  mitigation.	  
In	  summary,	  even	  without	  global	  action	  to	  reduce	  emissions,	  multiple	  options	  to	  promote	  mitigation	  
in	  developing	  countries	  exist.	  However,	  such	  a	  piecemeal	  approach	  that	  relies	  on	  ‘low	  hanging	  fruits’	  
will	   probably	   lead	   to	   considerably	   slower	   progress	   than	   expected	   under	   optimistic	   mitigation	  
scenarios.	   This	   approach	   will	   not	   be	   cost	   efficient	   at	   a	   global	   scale	   and	   is	   very	   likely	   to	   render	  
ambitious	   climate	   targets	   more	   costly	   or	   even	   infeasible	   to	   achieve.	   However,	   the	   piecemeal	  
improvements	  and	  the	  implied	  sub-­‐optimal	  global	  emission	  trajectory	  may,	  at	  least	  to	  some	  extent,	  
avoid	   lock-­‐in	   into	   carbon-­‐intensive	   infrastructure,	   keep	   the	   option	   of	   more	   ambitious	   future	  
mitigation	  open	  and	  pave	  the	  way	  towards	  a	  global	  climate	  agreement.	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